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Introduction 
When the Pacific War was over, I was taking a training to become a 
commanding officer of the KORYLI (Seadragon), a five-man midget 
submarine, modified version of the two-man submarine which penetrated 
Pearl Harbor in 1941. Missions in these submarines were not suicidal, but 
very nearly so, because they were automatically forced to the surface after 
firing one torpedo out of two due to the loss of balance. They would float in 
front of the target for about twenty seconds, submerge to normal depth, fire 
the second torpedo and come up again. It was a "secret weapon" in the hands 
of the Japanese Imperial Navy before the end of the war. About 150 such 
submarines were ready to fight against the landing forces of the United 
States. 
I mention this to underline the difference between my feelings at that time, 
and my feelings now. I had no fear of death during the war. I was not afraid of 
fighting against a superior force for the sake of the nation. But I am much 
more afraid of death now. Although 1 have taught for a long time at the 
National Defence College (currently the National Institute for Defence 
Studies) about international security, my sentiments are very different from 
what they were in the prewar period. 
The difference in my feelings is also tied to the atomic bombing of Hiro- 
shima. I was in the Submarine School at Otake, 40 kilometers away from 
Hiroshima when the bomb was dropped, and saw the flash of the explosion 
and the mushroom cloud, and felt the shockwave. Two days later, I walked 
through Hiroshima for about two hours. I was told that if I had been there for 
five hours I would have been fatally affected, but fortunately I was not 
exposed to the radiation long enough for that. When I came back to Kure, 
which was near my home port at that time, my group and I got very drunk, to 
try and expunge the nightmare we had seen. The drinking helped save my 
life, flushing out the radiation. I do not know whether to believe that or not, 
but in any case I am still here. 
Only someone who had gone through the same experience, I think, could 
understand the anxieties I had after the war, especially when I was about to 
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have my first child. Even my wife did not really understand. At any rate, these 
feelings make up a part of my mentality. Frankly speaking, the Japanese 
"nuclear allergy" is something that ought to persist. It is unacceptable to use 
atomic weapons for any reason, under any reason, under any conditions. At 
the same time, I have to acknowledge the effectiveness of nuclear weapons as 
a deterrent. This is the dilemma I have to confront in my own thinking. 
A Retrospect of the Japanese 
Postwar National Security Policies 
Looking back at the Japanese national security posture in the postwar period, 
it is very interesting to find various forms of "shock" or "surprise" that shaped 
the national stance at that moment. The first shock was the atomic bombs, 
dropped at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This "atom shock" accelerated the 
Japanese unconditional surrender and caused the Japanese decision to start 
as a new peaceful nation with no arms. The "New Constitution" was thus 
wholeheartedly accepted by the Japanese people. It was General MacArthur 
who guided the Japanese leaders toward this goal - Japan as the "Switzerland 
of Asia". However, fortunately or unfortunately, it did not take long before 
Japan had to give up such %on-arms" peace-state position because of w 
unexpected external force. 
The second shock came to Japan when the Korean war broke out, and all 
the combatant forces were immediately sent to Korea from Japan. This 
"vacuum shock" caused the Japanese change, of course, towards forming up 
their own self-protection forces, initially in the name of "Police Reserve 
Force", then "National Security Force", and finally the present "Self Defense 
Forces". The Korean Peninsula has always been one of the important "threat 
routes" to the Japanese. The same kind of "vacuum shock" in the shape of the 
"Nixon Doctrine" after the Vietnam War debacle pushed Japan to increase 
the self-help efforts. As the American forces withdrew from the neighboring 
area, Japanese self-defence capability had to be promoted by the American 
request. 
The third shock was with the MIG-25 incident. The defector Belenko 
landed surprisingly at the Hakodate airport, Hokkaido, the northern island of 
the Japan archipelago, penetrating through the blind part of the radar 
coverage, which was regarded as the same as "surprise attack" in war 
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emergency. This could be said to be a "blind shock" or a "surprise attack 
shock and Japanese authorities concerned felt the necessity of filling up the 
blind so that we could protect the sovereign territory from being destroyed 
without notice. This feeling as well as necessity was fortified when, 
surprisingly, the Russian troops invaded Afganistan. 
The fourth shock is the "partnership shock. In spite of the closer 
relationship between the United States and Japan, increasing pressure have 
been brought to bear on Japan resulting in unpleasant feelings. What the 
United States have requested is that Japan should take a much greater 
"burdenff and "cost" as a "partner" of the United States, visibly or invisibly. 
The breaking of the one percent of GNP barrier for the defence budget was 
forcibly realized by this shock. The 'Toshiba incident" can be described as 
one of the "partner shocks". Even the "Ron-Yasu friendship" could not avoid 
a series of these shocks. 
What shape would the next "fifth shock take, then? If Japan were forced to 
invest more in the military in order to have a satisfactory capability in the 
eyes of the United States and other allies, this could be the one. However, my 
fear is that such shock would push Japan toward the same kind of situation 
we faced before the opening of the Pacific War as well as at the end of the war 
- frustrated responses. No one can tell at this moment whether another future 
shock would be paradoxically "Japan shock which would surely break the 
common understandings broadly held as the Japanese postwar general 
attitudes. Anyway, this kind of "future shock" would not be pleasant to 
anyone in the world. I pray that it would never happen. 
Mathematical Magic of Japanese Defence Budget Figures 
According to the Report on Allied Contribution to Common Defence published 
yearly by the US Department of Defence, Japan "ranks last, or nearest to last, 
on all of the ratio measures surveyed, and thus quite clearly appears to be 
contributing far less than its share of what it is capable of contributing". But, 
theoretically speaking, it is not meaningful to evaluate defence efforts in 
terms of money. If, even now, Japan's state budget is calculated in a little 
different way or formulation, the defense budget is slightly changed. It is said, 
this alone could produce at least 1.5% of GNP. Some say it would even reach 
2%. If it is 1.5%~~ Japan's defence expenditure will be the 6th highest in the 
West. If it is 2%, the expenditure will rise to the 4th highest ahead of UK and 
Hisao Iwashima 
France; there will be only the US, PRC and West Germany above Japan. 
Let me give another interesting example of the magic of figures. It is the 
exchange rate of yen to dollar. Its up-and-down fluctuation will result in 
changes in the international ranking of Japan's defence expenditure. In an 
extreme case, let us suppose Japan's defence expenditures rises to 2% of 
GNP, or twice the current level, while the exchange rate settles at 150 yen to 
the US dollar. To our surprise, non-nuclear Japan's defence expenditures will 
instantly jump up ranking only after the US and USSR Assuming the case of 
an exchange rate of 100 yen to US dollar and defence expenditures of 1% of 
GNP, the same level as at present, Japan also stands at the third, without even 
a penny increase, to our great surprise. Thus, a little change in the figures 
could well turn Japan into one of the leading military powers in the 
world. 
Japanese contribution to security, which cannot be converted into 
monetary terms, is great, indeed, beyond expression. First, the topographical 
and strategic importance of Japan must be mentioned. The presence of Japan 
in the Far East as a member state of the Western alliance, itself constitutes a 
contribution of enormous sislificance. What would happen, if Japan stood 
for the East? The mere thought of it would cause a nightmare in the West. 
Secondly, the topographical importance of a Japan surrounded by sea is 
enormous. Even at the age of nuclear missiles no one can deny that such 
topographical merit of Japan provides a great contribution to the security of 
the West. 
The third is Japan's offering of bases in Japan. Japan has undertaken the 
large expenditures concerning the US Forces stationed in Japan, to a degree 
which compars favorably with any NATO member state by now, and it is 
without doubt that Japan is contributing a great deal by offering bases with 
the highest capability and conditions in this strategically important area. This 
can never be converted to money. Japan is offering not only visible 
contributions such as land and services, but also invisible contributions such 
as technologies and talent. 
The fourth is the economic aid Japan gives to the third world. It should be 
acknowledged how much it is contributing to the stabilization of conflict- 
prone areas. 
To summarize, we should understand well that it does not make sense to 
attempt international comparision of Japan's defence efforts merely by citing 
figures. It is necessary for both laymen and specialists to pay more attention 
to the defence efforts on the soft side, rather than stressing the hard sides. 
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Basic Principles of the Present Japanese Defence Policy 
The present Japanese national security policy is based on the principle of 
"Comprehensive National Security", which puts its foundation on the prin- 
ciples of (a) non-nuclear, (b) denial of militarism, having only "self-defence" 
capability, and (c) the US-Japan mutual security system. And, the triad of 
managing the comprehensive national security policy is (i) smooth and 
effective management of the US-Japan mutual security system, (ii) building- 
up of the steady, moderate, efficient, and minimally-required capability for 
defending Japan, and (iii) pursuit of active diplomacy to stabilize the inter- 
national environment. 
The firm commitment to the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, the agree- 
ment of guideline for the mutual defence cooperation, operation of the joint 
exercises, conclusion of the military technology transfer to the US, various 
steps to reduce the financial burden of the US in having forces stationed in 
Japan, etc., entail: first, confirmation of the self-defence posture under the 
peace constitution, a negative position of refusing to become a military great 
power under tight civilian control, maintenance of the three non-nuclear 
principles; secondly, the decision of mid-term defence build-up program, the 
slight breaking of 1% GNP ceiling in defence expenditures, etc.; and, thirdly, 
efforts to maintain freedom and peace in cooperation with the West, continu- 
ing support for the dialogue towards peace and disarmament, efforts to 
stabilize various conflicts, including the Iran-Iraq war, the Cambodia 
problem and the North-South confrontation in the Korean Peninsula, 
economic assistance for stabilizing and developing the Third World, as well 
as economic cooperation to strengthen the political, economic and social 
foundation of less-developed states in an effort to contribute greatly to world 
peace and stability. 
The present Japanese defence posture greatly differs from that of ten years 
ago. Let me remind you of one interesting story. Japanese authorities treated 
the Russian pilot who in 1976 defected in a MIG-25 as a violator against air 
traffic and immigration laws, not as an invader of Japanese territory. This was 
the reality of Japan's defence at that time. On the other hand, the latest debate, 
as you may have observed, has been very tolerant of the official attitude 
towards defence. Formerly, it was a taboo to talk about the subject, but now it 
is an open topic of debate; frankly I would say, because of pressure brought 
to bear on Japan, especially by the United States, and because of other 
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external factors. The Japanese defence posture has changed remarkably. 
The Changing Nature of International Conflicts 
and Free-Thought Crisis Scenarios 
According to an article by Dr. Bertram, former Director of the London 
Institute of International Affairs, conflict in the 1980s is shaped by the 
following factors: First, military power cannot always play a decisive role in 
conflict resolution; second, the cost accompanying the use of military power 
has skyrocketed beyond any level in our previous experience; third, and 
consequently, the large scale application of modern military power is 
practically impossible - to be forced into such an application may mean the 
bankruptcy of the state. In other words, the political gains the state make by 
using military power is out of all proportion to the cost. The use of force is not 
only enormously expensive, but carries with it fatal risks at every political, 
economic, diplomatic and psychological level. Military costs cannot be 
balanced with the political benefits obtained. 
Other professional papers presented at the various strategic meetings 
have listed the following additional factors to account for the changing nature 
of conflict. First, the ideological confrontation which laid the foundations of 
East-West conflict has faded away. Second, geographical distance matters 
less in the likely areas of conflict, given the rapid and remarkable 
development of means of communication and transportation; conflict 
becomes more likely in remote areas as well in neighboring areas. Third, 
territorial ambitions now count for less as sources of conflict than economic 
issues and issues involving natural resources. Fourth, most conflicts between 
nations are triggered by internal instabilities rather than external tensions. 
And fifth, "lmachismo" plays a role in theories of recent conflicts, among them 
confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Falkland 
conflict, the Iran-Iraq war, and others. This is a new interesting factor, 
especially cited by American strategic specialists. 
Finally, to add one more special feature which determines international 
conflicts in the future. It is that confrontations within the Western or Eastetn 
bloc are likely to take place more frequently than East-West confrontations. If 
I took a free-thought approach to the future Japanese defence problems 
along the line mentioned above the US-Japan decoupling scenario would be 
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a more serious case than a Soviet invasion of Japanese territory. The second 
case would result from the first.The Japanese self-defence forces would then 
be defunctional caused by the cut of the US supply to Japan. The third crisis 
would also be between the US and Japan, in the form of a "Star Wars" 
between the two. In this way, future crisis scenario for Japan is likely to be 
"paradoxical". 
Range of Defence Choices for Japan and Three Actors 
In the changing nature of conflict Japan's defence options have to meet the 
following requirements: first, it should be able to respond to new challenges, 
and to further reflect the will of the people; secondly, it should be based on 
basic principles within the comprehensive conceptual framework of national 
defence; thirdly, it should be of a size proportionate to the national economy; 
fourth, it should have an adjustment function as well as a violence of destruc- 
tion function; and fifth, if should be flexible enough to respond promptly to 
any unpredicted future critical situation. The importance of these require- 
ments is to acknowledge the role of the military, not only in the application of 
force, but in the political arrangement and adjustment as well. 
What about Japan's defence choices, given the changing nature of conflict 
and changing function of military power? Japan has a wide range of options 
in determining her defence policy, but aside from two extremes of full 
nuclear armament and total rejection of defence efforts, there are three main 
options currently receiving attention. The first is to continue the present 
policy, holding the defence budget at the level of about 1% of GNP. This 
would mean that quantity would be maintained or slightly increased while 
quality would be gradually upgraded in keeping with modern technology. A 
second option is the doubling of the size of current forces as rapidly as 
possible, together with a far-reaching upgrading of technological quality. 
This would see an increase of defence expenditures to a minimum of 2% of 
GNP and rise to 4% of GNP currently the level in the Federal Republic of 
Germany. The third option is a compromise between the other two, 
involving the gradual increase of both size and quality, with the likelihood of 
achieving a defence budget of 1.5% of GNP over a ten year period. 
Which policy to be followed depends on many factors, not the least the 
assessment of the immediacy of the Soviet "threat". It is my belief that there is 
not yet in Japan a consensus between the policy decision level and the 
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popular level of consciousness. In the determination of Japan's defence 
policy at least three elements or actors play major parts: first, political 
leadership; secondly, the bearer of the defence operation, the Self-Defence 
Forces; and thirdly, the popular base of support. It is not possible to bring 
about a strengthening of Japan's defensive forces unless all three elements 
take the same direction. Furthermore, there are two additional major 
elements. These are the intentions of the United States and the support and 
attitudes of the other governments of the Asia/Pacific region. These are 
matters which cannot, and should not be decided by Japan alone, even in the 
determination of Japan's defence. If Japan begins to adopt a policy of Fukoku- 
Kyohei (enrich the country and strengthen the military), would American or 
Asian people approve? I believe that Japan was not wrong when she choose 
to become an Economic Power rather than a Military Power after 1945, 
Conclusion 
In concluding this paper, let me propose a new "Pacific Conflict Monitor and 
Prevention System" in which Japan can make a great contribution to meet 
the changing world's demand. This is a sort of modified version of the 
"Pacific Basin Cooperation" concept adopted by the late Prime Minister 
Ohira which put an emphasis on the Japanese role in the field of economic 
development of the region. My proposed model expanding the Ohira model 
more towards the "crisis control" or "country risk" measuring and 
management functions can offer a broader base of multi-national coopera- 
tion between the advanced and the less advanced states, in which each state 
may contribute its own "indigenous due" for the international integrated 
cooperation and inter-dependency to its utmost. Japan's role in this system is 
to be mainly non-military, but the Self-Defence Forces can take "peace- 
keeping" missions in the form of non-military functions, exploiting their 
technological professionalism. Won-military use of military power" com- 
bined with "high-technology", would, I believe, be effective at various 
aspects in this new regional system, if the "political will" of each nation in this 
region did exist. 
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